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Abstract
This research examines China’s persistent effort to promote intellectual property rights (IPR) since
the 1980s. Laws of intellectual property were among the first batch of legislations in China’s market
reform. Since the mid-1980s, the state propaganda apparatus launched nationwide campaigns in five-
year cycles to “educate” Chinese people on the Party’s new market-oriented law and policy, including
laws of IPR. When intellectual property became core state policy in the 2000s, new initiatives
emerged under law promotion campaigns to “raise awareness” of intellectual property. Starting the
late 2000s, the promotion of IPR became stand-alone endeavors devoted to an innovation-friendly
“culture” of intellectual property that facilitated compliance with the law and promoted industrial
growth in cultural and media sectors.
The notion of “IPR culture” played a key role in governmental promotion endeavors after China
developed its national IPR strategy in the mid-2000s. In official discourse, “IPR culture” is
instrumental and serves to shape mind-sets and regulate behaviors. It seeks to extensively use the
Leninist media system to impose top-down pre-packaged understanding of intellectual property.
While engaging actively with Western theories and corporate practices, IPR propaganda in China
marginalizes and represses bottom-up challenges to the official stance in protection of private cultural
property.
China’s intellectual property propaganda campaigns are part of the state’s efforts to legitimate and
facilitate the market-oriented reform. Since the late 1970s, the market reform proceeded side-by-side
with ruthless repression of bottom-up resistance. IPR stood out in the state’s reform scheme at a time
when China’s (re)insertion into global capitalist political economy took place concurrently with
communication industries playing a key role to propel growth and IPR systems serving as the
cornerstone for the market. The state-led campaign to engineer a pro-market IPR culture manifests
China’s adoption of the logic of the global IPR regime, which will only subject China to the
hegemonic power of Western IPR discourse and distance the state’s cultural project from grassroots
dynamics of meaning making.
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Manufacturing “Culture”: The Promotion of Intellectual Property Rights in 
China 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Intellectual property rights (IPR) have caused significant tensions between the 
West and China over the past few decades. Researchers have attributed the 
problems of IPR in China to a number of reasons, notably the Confucian tradition, 
Chinese culture, and socialist ideology.1 This research seeks to contribute to an 
understanding of those tensions by documenting and examining massive and 
persistent media and propaganda campaigns to promote IPR in China. I argue that 
China’s IPR propaganda rose rapidly in influence and status when China 
embraced intellectual property as a core developmental policy. The ultimate goal 
is to manufacture an “IPR culture (zhishi chanquan wenhua)” that shapes 
mindsets and affects behaviors through top-down media campaigns that 
disseminate pro-market ideas. By internalizing the logic of the global IPR regime, 
the promotion of IPR in China serves to sustain rather than challenge the 
dominant political economic order in global cultural and informational sectors. 
The promotion of IPR in China is noteworthy in many regards. It is part of 
China’s persistent media and propaganda endeavor to promote state policy and 
reform agenda. Born out of pufa (mass legal education) campaigns, IPR 
promotional projects are cultural attempts to achieve political economic goals. 
Meanwhile, IPR as proprietarized control is a cornerstone system that facilitates 
commodification in cultural and information sectors. Thus, IPR promotional 
campaigns entail two different interpretations of “culture” simultaneously: they 
seek to intervene into “culture” as dynamic processes of meaning-making in order 
to feed “culture” as raw materials to cycles of capital reproduction. In addition, 
extensive IPR propaganda demonstrates how Leninist propagandist media are 
                                                        
1 William Alford, To Steal a Book is an Elegant Offense: Intellectual Property Law in 
Chinese Civilization (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995); Michel Oksenberg, 
Pitman B. Potter, and William B. Abnett, “Advancing Intellectual Property Rights: 
Information Technologies and the Course of Economic Development in China,” NBR 
Analysis 7, no. 4 (1996): 1-35.     
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employed to promote pro-market ideas. The counterintuitive combination of 
media structures born out of China’s anti-capitalist past and current media 
messages used to promote an IPR system that recognizes only “knowledge to be 
used and applied in an endless chain of commodification”2 gives rise to tensions 
and conflicts in IPR propaganda. Last but not the least, IPR in China, as well as in 
major Western countries, is not just about cultural and information sectors, but is 
at the core of national development and economic growth. The implications of the 
cultural work of IPR reach wide and deep into the contemporary global political 
economy.     
This article first provides a brief account of China's persistent efforts to 
educate its population on the legal system by means of pufa campaigns. It then 
discusses the Chinese state's adoption of IPR as a core developmental policy and 
the intensified promotion and propaganda activities that resulted. The next 
sections analyze the content and context of “IPR culture” and the conflicts in the 
cultural work of intellectual property. The conclusion argues that China’s IPR 
cultural project may in effect run against the developmental goal that the state 
envisions.    
 
Mass legal education in contemporary China  
 
The late 1970s witnessed profound changes in Chinese society, politics, and 
economy. New party and state leadership under Deng Xiaoping launched a series 
of market-oriented policies that significantly differed from previous decades. The 
notion of “rule of law” became prominent during the reform era, and a new legal 
system was built up as part of the new governance structure. The party 
propaganda apparatus became the propagator of reform initiatives and launched 
massive campaigns to educate the Chinese population on the new legal order.   
In contrast to the successive mass movements that had taken place in 
previous decades, the new leadership in China sought to maintain a stable 
political and social order. The Market Reform was prefaced by the repression of 
grassroots political challenges in the late 1970s, notably the “Xidan Democracy 
Wall (Xidan minzhu qiang)”in Beijing. The notion of “socialist democracy” in the 
                                                        
2  Laikwan Pang, Creativity and Its Discontents: China's Creative Industries and 
Intellectual Property Rights Offenses (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012), 225. 
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reform era emphasized not bottom-up political participation, but stabilization of 
the state bureaucracy.3 Lawmaking in the late 1970s catered to political agendas 
by crafting the Criminal Law and the Criminal Procedural Law in the first batch 
of legislation in the reform era. Promulgated together in 1978, they served to 
protect the political and social orders by reinstating the sole authority of state 
organs in the political and public sphere.  
Another aspect of legal development was the creation of laws to serve market 
and economic activities. Under the centrally-planned economy in the Maoist era, 
issues of private proprietorship, economic contracts, industrial investment, and 
intellectual property had been insignificant or were handled as political and public 
matters through governmental channels. The development of legal instruments to 
regulate the market was an urgent and important item on the reformers' agenda. 
To be sure, this was not an easy task. In the face of political and social resistance, 
as well as conflicts between bureaucratic agencies and interests, some key statutes 
including the Property Law had to wait until the late 2000s. Nevertheless, 
reformers managed to enact a number of market-serving statutes in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. These include the China-Foreign Joint Venture Enterprise Law in 
1979, the Economic Contract Law in 1981, and the Trademark Law in 1982, all of 
which predated the 1982 Constitution that set the politico-legal framework for 
contemporary China.        
With a number of new laws and regulations in place, propagation for a new 
“socialist legal system” gradually gained momentum. As Deng Xiaoping once put 
it: “What is important to the strengthening of the legal system is education. The 
fundamental issue is about educating people.”4 Routine legal education started in 
the late 1970s,5 and became institutionalized and coordinated nation-wide during 
the mid-1980s.6 In 1986, the first five-year pufa program was set in motion. 
                                                        
3 Maurice Meisner, Mao's China and After: A History of the People's Republic (New York: 
Free Press, 1999). 
4 Deng Xiaoping, quoted in “China's Top Legislator Calls for ‘Upsurge in Propaganda’ on 
Legal System,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific - Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, April 24, 2011.  
5 Ronald J. Troyer, “Publicizing the New Laws: The Public Legal Education Campaign,” in 
Social Control in the People's Republic of China, eds. Ronald J. Troyer, John P. Clark, 
and Dean G. Rojek (New York: Praeger, 1995), 70-83.   
6  Lina Xia, “Wunian Pufa de Youlai [The Origin of Five Year Pufa Programs],” 
Han / Manufacturing “Culture”
communication+1 Vol. 6 [2017], Iss. 1, Article 4
3
 4 
Literally meaning to “popularize law,” pufa programs were run by the Propaganda 
Department of the Party and the Ministry of Justice in an effort to educate every 
Chinese citizen on the legal system. This was a massive endeavor that involved a 
number of governmental agencies and judicial organs including the court, the 
procuratorate, as well as the police. Pufa campaigns reached widely into 
state-owned enterprises, schools, the military, as well as the countryside. 7 
According to the Ministry of Justice, more than three hundred million people 
received legal education during the first year of pufa (1986). 8  During the 
five-year cycle from 1986 to 1990, about seven hundred million people took part 
in pufa activities.9   
In the following decades, pufa was integrated into China’s five-year plans of 
national development and was conducted also in five-year cycles. It always 
involved high-profile propaganda campaigns, in which state-controlled media 
outlets, including newspapers, television, radio, and later the Internet all devoted 
spaces to disseminate legal knowledge. Governmental organs and state-owned 
corporations organized study sessions for their employees, and public activities 
were held, including public lectures and seminars as well as propaganda booths 
and tables in the streets. In the 2000s and after, pufa continued to play an 
important role in China’s political and social sphere. In 2001, a notice by the 
Communist Party’s Central Committee and the State Council called mass legal 
education “an important legal guarantee for the implementation of the 10th 
Five-Year Plan.”10 At the onset of the sixth five-year pufa program in 2011, 
China’s top legislator called for “a new upsurge in propaganda and education on 
                                                                                                                                                       
NPC.gov.cn, 2016, http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/zgrdzz/2016-05/30/content_1990639.htm.  
7 Troyer, “Publicizing the New Laws”; Xia, “The Origin.” 
8 Yu Zou, “Guanyu 1986 Nian Guanche Shishi Quanguo Renda Changweihui Zai Gongmin 
zhong JIben Puji Falv Changshi de Jueyi de Qingkuang de Baogao [Report on the 
Implementation of the NPC Standing Committee's Decision to Popularize Basic Legal 
Knowledge among Citizens],” NPC.gov.cn, 1987, 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2000-12/14/content_5001905.htm.  
9 Xia, “The Origin.” 
10 “China Issues Notice on Launching Propaganda, Education on Legal System,” BBC 
Monitoring Asia Pacific - Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, May 27, 
2001. 
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legal system.”11   
The emphases of pufa programs always change alongside party and state 
policy shifts. The first five-year program starting in 1986 focused on the so-called 
“ten laws and one regulation (shi fa yi tiaoli),” including the Constitution, 
Criminal Law, Criminal Procedural Law, the General Principles of Civil Law, and 
the Economic Contract law, all of which are key legal instruments that constituted 
the policy turn in the reform era.12 When market reform deepened in the 1990s, 
the second five-year pufa program “centered on economic development (weirao 
jingji jianshe zhege zhongxin)” and focused on legal issues pertaining to “the 
establishment of the market economy system (shichang jingji tizhi jianli).13 After 
China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, WTO rules 
and regulations became new priorities in pufa.14 Laws of intellectual property, 
while part of the first five-year program 1986-1990,15 stood out only after 
China’s accession to the WTO and significantly rose in prominence in pufa 
campaigns after China formally adopted IPR as a key developmental strategy.  
 
China’s embrace of intellectual property 
 
Contrary to general assumptions, the Chinese government has paid significant 
attention to intellectual property since the early 1980s. Key IPR statutes, 
including the Patent Law, Copyright Law, and Trademark Law, were early on the 
agenda of Chinese reformers. The Trademark Law and the Patent Law was made 
in 1982 and 1984, respectively, before the U.S. first expressed IPR concerns to 
                                                        
11 “China’s Top Legislator.” 
12 Troyer, “Publicizing the New Laws”; Xia, “The Origin.” 
13 Yang Xiao, “Guanyu Dierge Wunian Pufa Guihua Shishi Qingkuang de Baogao [Report 
on the Implementation of the Second Five-Year Pufa Program],” NPC.gov.cn, 1993, 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2000-12/28/content_5003013.htm.  
14 Yishun Xiao, “Jiangqiang Zhishi Chanquan Xuanchuan Nuli Wei Zhishi Chanquan de 
Chuangzao yu Baohu Fuwu [Strengthen IPR Legal Propaganda to Serve the Creation and 
Protection of IPR],” in Zhishi Chanquan yu Gaige Kaifang 30 Nian [IPR and 30 Years of 
Reform and Opening Up], ed. Editorial Board (Beijing: Zhishi Chanquan Chubanshe, 
2008), 199-208.    
15 Ibid.  
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China in 1985.16 The making of the Copyright Law was also driven by domestic 
agendas until the late 1980s. The law was on the verge of passage in 1987, but 
was stalled because of inter-agency disagreements on its impact on educational 
and research sectors.17 Upon reentering the legislative pipeline, it collided with 
intense American pressure that resulted in a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) between the two countries in May 1989. The Copyright Law was finally 
promulgated in 1990. It incorporated China’s concessions in the 1989 MOU and 
bore distinct marks of U.S. pressure.18  
Through the 1990s, the U.S. forced China into three IPR agreements through 
intense trade threats. The U.S. Trade Representative claimed to have had 18 
meetings in 11 months with the Chinese government in the mid-1990s, “clearly 
the most intense set of meetings we have ever had with any country on any trade 
agreement in American history.”19 U.S. trade threats weakened after China’s 
accession to the WTO in 2001 due to WTO rules, as well as to the fact that China 
had already established an up-to-date intellectual property system.20 Domestic 
                                                        
16 Regarding early U.S. communication with China on matters of IPR, See Warren H. 
Maruyama, “U.S.-China IPR Negotiations: Trade, Intellectual Property and Rule of Law 
in a Global Economy,” in Chinese Intellectual Property Law and Practice, eds. Mark A. 
Cohen, A. Elizabeth Bang, and Stephanie J. Mitchell (Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
1999), 165-212; Peter K. Yu, The Second Coming of Intellectual Property Rights in China 
(New York: Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, 2002).    
17 Dong Han, “How the Copyright Law Was (Not) Made: Intellectual Property and China’s 
Contested Integration with Global Capitalism,” International Journal of Communication 
8, (2014), 1516-1535.  
18 Han, “How the Copyright Law Was (Not) Made”; Mingde Li, Tebie 301 Tiaokuan yu 
Zhongmei Zhishi Chanquan Zhengduan [Special 301 and Sino-US Intellectual Property 
Disputes] (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 2000). 
19 The U.S.-China intellectual property rights agreement and related trade issues: Joint 
hearing before the Subcommittees on International Economic Policy and Trade and Asia 
and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 
and the Subcommittee of East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on foreign 
Relations Senate, One Hundred Fourth Congress, second session, March 7, 1996 
(Washington D.C.: USGPO, 1997), 7.  
20 Peter K. Yu, “TRIPS Enforcement and Developing Countries,” American University 
International Law Review 26, (2011), 727-782.  
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initiatives started to regain control on IPR development. The idea of a national 
IPR strategy (guojia zhishi chanquan zhanlue) began to circulate among Chinese 
political leaders since the turn of the century. In 2005, formal efforts to draft the 
strategy kicked off with the establishment of the Leadership Group (lingdao 
xiaozu) for the Making of National IPR Strategy, a high-rank inter-agency 
organization that enlisted the heads of 28 governmental organs ranging from 
intellectual property and trade regulators to strategic planners like the 
Development and Reform Commission.21 In 2008, the State Council passed the 
National IPR Strategy Outline (guojia zhishi chanquan zhanlue gangyao) and 
circulated it all over the country.  
The National IPR Strategy Outline (hereinafter “Strategy Outline”) sees 
intellectual property not as sectorial regulation but as a key component of China’s 
development and transformation. It argues that “knowledge resources (zhishi 
ziyuan)” are of strategic importance, and that IPR is the “foundational system 
(jiben zhidu).” It further points out that IPR is becoming the “core element (hexin 
yaosu)” of international competition and the key to build a “creative nation 
(chuangxinxing guojia).” Its recognition of IPR’s central role in the national 
developmental strategy set the tone for policymaking in the following decade. In 
2015, two policy documents further elaborated on the importance of IPR. The 
Several Opinions on Deepening System Reform and Accelerating the 
Implementation of Creativity-Driven Developmental Strategy, issued by the 
Communist Party’s Central Committee and the State Council, argued that the 
creativity-driven strategy is to let the market determine the allocation of resources 
and provide strict protection of intellectual property. The Several Opinions on 
Accelerating the Construction of an IPR-Strong Nation, issued by the State 
Council, aims to create China’s “new IPR advantages (zhishi chanquan xin 
youshi)” in international competition and to build a world-class, IPR-strong nation 
(zhishi chanquan qiangguo).  
China’s embrace of IPR has its roots in China’s legal reform, media 
marketization, and reshuffling of social classes over the past few decades.22 In the 
context of accelerated economic restructuring in the late 2000s and 2010s, IPR 
                                                        
21 Office for the Leadership Group for the Making of National IPR Strategy, “On the 
Making of National IPR Strategy,” in IPR Yearbook 2005 ed. IPR Yearbook Editorial 
Board (Beijing: Zhishi Chanquan Chubanshe, 2007), 35-36.  
22 Han, “How the Copyright Law Was (Not) Made.” 
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policy rose further in prominence by closely aligning with the state’s 
developmental goal. On the one hand, the Strategy Outline coincided with the 
global crisis in 2008, an important catalyst for accelerated economic restructuring 
in present-day China.23 After years of preparation, it was formally published and 
circulated in June, right before the financial meltdown hit global news headlines 
in fall 2008. On the other hand, decades of market-oriented reform and 
ideological shifts have paved the way for intellectual property to assume a central 
role in China’s cultural and information industries, which have come to the core 
of the economic restructuring scheme. In 2017, the State Council promulgated the 
National IPR Protection and Utilization Plan for the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan, 
formally recognizing IPR as a key developmental project and a top policy 
priority.24               
  
The Propaganda Week and intensified IPR promotion   
 
IPR has been an important part of pufa as early as 1986, when the Patent Law and 
the Trademark Law were both included in mass legal education.25 At the turn of 
the century, IPR propaganda became a stand-alone project. After the Strategy 
Outline of 2008, the promotion of intellectual property increased significantly in 
scale and intensity and placed significant emphasis on the creation of “IPR culture 
(zhishi chaquan wenhua).”  
Under the larger framework of pufa, China started to launch annual IPR 
promotional campaigns in the early 2000s on the World Intellectual Property Day 
(April 26). Starting from 2004, the one-day event was expanded into week-long 
activities known as the IPR Propaganda Week (zhishi chanquan xuanchuanzhou). 
It often involves large-scale public activities in big cities across the country, 
including exhibitions, open-house events, public lectures, seminars, information 
                                                        
23 Yu Hong, Networking China: The Digital Transformation of the Chinese Economy (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 2017); Dan Schiller, Digital Depression: Information 
Technology and Economic Crisis (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2014).     
24 Xinhua News Agency, “State Council Promulgated the National IPR Protection and 
Utilization Plan for the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan [Guowuyuan Yinfa Shisanwu Zhishi 
Chanquan Yunyong he Baohu Guihua],” Gov.cn, 2017, 
http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2017-01/13/content_5159586.htm.  
25 Xiao, “Strengthen IPR Legal Propaganda.” 
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booths in the streets, on-site intellectual property consultations, and so on. The 
IPR Propaganda Week in 2005 hosted over 900 seminars, put up 600,000 posters, 
distributed 1.2 million propaganda materials, and conducted 350,000 
consultations nationwide.26 In 2008, the Propaganda Week staged more than 810 
events across the country, and more than 1.3 million people were directly 
involved.27  After the Strategy Outline of 2008, the IPR Propaganda Week 
received a major upgrade. In 2009, 24 governmental agencies took part in the 
Propaganda Week, almost twice as much as before. According to the China 
Intellectual Property News (zhishi chanquan bao), published by the State 
Intellectual Property Office (SIPO), such wide participation by governmental 
organs helped to “infuse the concept of IPR into almost all economic sectors.”28 
In terms of scale, content, and format, activities in the 2009 Propaganda Week 
were “unprecedented (qiansuo weiyou)” and “created a very good public opinion 
environment (lianghao de yulun fenwei) for the implementation of the National 
IPR Strategy.”29 
Various media outlets play active roles during and outside of the annual IPR 
Propaganda Week. Even before the IPR strategy was officially promulgated, head 
of the SIPO had argued that the very first step to implement the strategy was to 
“further strengthen IPR propaganda and education” by “making full use of 
television, newspapers, and other media.” 30  The Propaganda Week always 
involves the release of IPR information through press conferences and the 
publication of governmental reports. In addition to intense coverage of various 
promotional and educational activities, media involvement can take many forms. 
In 2017, a provincial IPR administration produced a four-episode documentary on 
the development of intellectual property in China. Entitled “The Nation's Ultimate 
Weapon (guo zhi liqi),” it was premiered on TV on April 26, the World 
                                                        
26 Ibid. 
27 Qishan Wang, “No More Chinese Knock-offs,” Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition), 
June 17, 2008. 
28 Yu Wang and Qun Li, “Linian Quanguo Zhishi Chanquan Xuanchuanzhou Huodong 
Saomiao [A Scan of the IPR Propaganda Week in Each Year],” SIPO.gov.cn, 2013, 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo2013/mtjj/2013/201304/t20130418_792192.html.  
29 Ibid.  
30 Jingchuan Wang, “Working Report to the National Patent Conference,” in IPR Yearbook 
2005 ed. IPR Yearbook Editorial Board (Beijing: Zhishi Chanquan Chubanshe, 2005), 19.  
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Intellectual Property Day and the last day of the Propaganda Week.    
With the promulgation of the national IPR strategy, the notion of “IPR culture 
(zhishi chanquan wenhua)” emerged in official discourse. The Strategy Outline of 
2008 listed IPR culture as one of its four short-term goals, expecting to see “the 
general increase of IPR awareness (zhshi chanquan yishi) and the preliminary 
formation of IPR cultural environment (zhishi chanquan wenhua fenwei)” in five 
years. For that purpose, China’s strategic focus (zhanlue zhongdian) needs to be 
on “the nurturing of IPR culture (peiyu zhishi chanquan wenhua).” Five years 
later, several agencies governing IPR, cultural industry, education, and commerce 
jointly issued the Several Opinions on the Strengthening of IPR Cultural 
Construction in 2013 (hereinafter “Several Opinions”), which claimed that the 
goal of “preliminary formation of IPR cultural environment” had been achieved. 
Nevertheless, the Several Opinions called for “massive efforts to construct (dali 
jianshe) IPR culture” because it still could not meet the requirement of the 
national IPR strategy.   
 
Engineering an instrumental IPR culture 
 
In official accounts, the IPR culture that the national strategy seeks to promote 
and nurture is explicitly instrumental and serves to regulate behaviors and 
promote compliance with the law. Before formally being made into the Strategy 
Outline of 2008, the notion of IPR culture had appeared in a number of 
semi-governmental and scholarly occasions. Its discussion reached a high water 
mark in 2007, when the SIPO hosted the China IPR Culture Forum. The forum 
attracted attendees from governmental agencies, universities, research institutions, 
state-owned companies, and private businesses from all over China. Presentations 
in the forum were later edited into a book, which remains a leading publication on 
IPR culture in China today. The SIPO’s Associate Director (also the editor of the 
book) penned the first chapter “IPR Culture and the National IPR Strategy.” It 
defines culture as “a powerful, invisible force…that influences the formation of 
social norms and ethics rules…results in self-discipline of ideas and 
behaviors…and guides the direction of social development."31 Another SIPO 
                                                        
31 Binghui Lin, “Zhishi Chanquan Wenhua yu Guojia Zhishi Chanquan Zhanlue [IPR 
Culture and National IPR Strategy],” in 2007 Zhongguo Zhishi Chanquan Wenhua 
Luntan Lunwenji [Collection of Articles from 2007 China IPR Culture Forum], ed. 
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official and a leading advocate of IPR culture argued that IPR culture is about 
values and “plays an indispensable role in the making and implementation of the 
law.”32 To reinforce the inner-agency consensus, a third SIPO official argued that 
IPR culture is “soft power” that “impacts or determines a social group’s opinions 
and activities.” 33  The Several Opinions of 2013 officially recognized the 
instrumental role of IPR culture by stating: “IPR culture…is an important 
thoughts-and-awareness guarantee (sixiang yishi baozhang) of the implementation 
of the national IPR strategy and the construction of a creative nation.”   
The construction of IPR culture is a governmental project. The Strategy 
Outline specifically states that IPR culture is “guided by the government, 
supported by (state-owned) news media, and with extensive participation by the 
public (zhengfu zhudao, xinwen meiti zhicheng, shehui gongzhong guangfan 
canyu).” The Several Opinions of 2013 stipulates that the Communist Party’s 
Central Propaganda Department (zhongxuanbu) and the SIPO are to take the lead 
in IPR cultural construction, and are responsible for incorporating IPR into 
cultural and propaganda work at various levels of local governments. It needs to 
be noted that there is nothing strange in Chinese politics and media to carry out 
massive propaganda campaigns to promote certain causes. The Communist 
Party’s press philosophy emphasizes the “mass line,” i.e. “from the masses, to the 
masses.” It is paternalistic and does not tolerate independent voices, and in 
practice “the two-way mass line model has been severely lopsided in favor of 
top-down communication.” 34  The Leninist propagandist employment of the 
media, with some transformations, remains a defining feature of Chinese media 
                                                                                                                                                       
Binghui Lin (Beijing: Zhishi Chanquan Chubanshe, 2007), 2.  
32 Weiye Ma, “Lun Wenhua he Zhishi Chanquan Wenhua [On Culture and IPR Culture],” 
in 2007 Zhongguo Zhishi Chanquan Wenhua Luntan Lunwenji [Collection of Articles 
from 2007 China IPR Culture Forum], ed. Binghui Lin (Beijing: Zhishi Chanquan 
Chubanshe, 2007), 24. 
33 Xiucheng Han, “Zhishi Chanquan Wenhua yu Wenhua Ruanshili [IPR Culture and 
Cultural Soft Power],” in 2007 Zhongguo Zhishi Chanquan Wenhua Luntan Lunwenji 
[Collection of Articles from 2007 China IPR Culture Forum], ed. Binghui Lin (Beijing: 
Zhishi Chanquan Chubanshe, 2007), 28.  
34 Yuezhi Zhao, Media, Market, and Democracy in China: Between the Party Line and the 
Bottom Line (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998), 30. 
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today. 35  Inheriting the mass propaganda toolkit from pufa campaigns, IPR 
propaganda is carried out in a top-down manner with prefixed definitions on what 
IPR is and what it does, expecting to indoctrinate them so as to promote 
compliance with the law.  
Meanwhile, IPR propaganda has unique features compared with pufa 
campaigns. National pufa programs were launched in the mid-1980s, early in the 
Market Reform when a large number of laws and regulations were promulgated in 
a short time span. They were not upgrades of older codes but part of a new 
governance structure that relied on a stable bureaucracy and market-oriented rules 
(in contrast to mass movements and politics during the Cultural Revolution). 
Public legal education was thus an essential move to bring the Chinese population 
on board of social and political changes in the reform era, and it was in this sense 
that even semi-illiterate peasants could find pufa relevant and accessible.36 
Dedicated IPR propaganda campaigns, however, developed alongside the 
deepening of market reform and China’s integration with capitalist global political 
economy. Major IPR statutes were all promulgated in the 1980s and were by no 
means new law in the 2000s (as in contrast to the first pufa program in 1986). 
They were cloaked under prior and broader reform measures instead of making 
groundbreaking statements of political U-turns. Compared with pufa campaigns 
that always place the Constitution at the core, China’s IPR propaganda often 
appears apolitical and frames IPR as universally beneficial.  
The notion of IPR culture, by affirming the legitimacy of cultural 
commodification and the cornerstone role of intellectual property, shows a 
dramatic breakaway from the pre-reform concept of culture as political and 
revolutionary. For example, the Strategy Outline’s opening gambit is to claim 
intellectual property to be “the foundational system to cultivate and utilize 
knowledge resources (kaifa he liyong zhishi ziyuan de jiben zhidu).” Framing 
knowledge as a resource to be “cultivated” and “utilized,” the Strategy Outline set 
the tone of China’s intellectual property policy by casting culture and information 
out of the political and social sphere. It goes on to state that IPR defines people’s 
                                                        
35  Yuezhi Zhao, “Sustaining and Contesting Revolutionary Legacies in Media and 
Ideology,” in Mao's Invisible Hand: The Political Foundations of Adaptive Governance 
in China, eds. Sebastian Heilmann and Elizabeth J. Perry (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Asian Center, 2011). 
36 Xia, “The Origin.” 
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“rights” and regulates “relations of (economic) interest (liyi guanxi)” in the 
“creation and utilization of knowledge and other information,” thus affirming the 
legitimacy of private control and the market mechanism in the cultural and 
information sector. Likewise, official accounts of IPR culture often adopt 
commodified definitions of culture and information in a matter-of-fact manner. 
According to the Several Opinions of 2013, in the ideal IPR cultural environment, 
people “respect knowledge, advocate innovation, and abide by law honestly and 
in good faith (zunzhong zhishi, chongshang chuangxin, chengxin shoufa).” By 
equating IPR with social morals and norms, it conceals the private nature of 
intellectual property and precludes inquiries into the legitimacy of, and 
alternatives to, the market in the realm of culture and knowledge.  
 
The conflict-ridden cultural work of intellectual property   
 
China’s embrace of IPR is a developmental strategy formulated under specific 
historical circumstances. The Market Reform initiated at a time when large-scale 
privatization swept through major Western countries, and when informational and 
cultural sectors became the propellant of global economy.37 Meanwhile, after 
centuries of growth and transformation, laws of intellectual property became the 
major form of market regulation in commercial media and technology sectors.38 
China’s reform step-by-step opened Chinese market and reinserted China into the 
global capitalist political economy. With the inflow of Western goods and 
investment, as well as the growth of an export-oriented economy reliant on 
Western markets, China became susceptible to Western influence and threats. 
When the U.S. started to pressure other countries on IPR matters through trade 
threats in the mid-1980s and after,39 China was forced to make concessions and 
to fast-track to adopt global IPR rules. China’s national IPR strategy, taking shape 
                                                        
37 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); 
Dan Schiller, How to Think About Information? (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 
2007); Yuezhi Zhao, “After Mobile Phones, What? Re-embedding the Social in China's 
‘Digital Revolution’,” International Journal of Communication 1, (2007), 92-120.  
38 Christopher May and Susan K. Sell, Intellectual Property Rights: A Critical History 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienners Publishers, 2006). 
39 Susan K. Sell, Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property 
Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
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in the 2000s, came after China’s turn to follow the informationized growth model 
headed by the U.S.40 and the recognition of culture as a strategic industrial 
sector.41 The ascendance of IPR in China’s economic and developmental policy is 
China’s choice (albeit among limited options) to follow the mainstream growth 
path in the capitalist West. Against this historical context, China’s promotion of 
IPR manifests the cultural work of the Chinese state trying to keep pace with the 
global IPR regime. It is a conflict-ridden project entangled in the frictions and 
collaborations between the Chinese state, transnational capital, domestic media 
and technology corporations, and various forms of social resistance to intellectual 
property.   
 A notable and unique feature of IPR propaganda in China is its wide 
engagement with Western ideas and institutions, rarely (if ever) seen in China’s 
other governmental media campaigns or pufa programs. A well-known researcher 
based in the U.S. argues that China’s political culture, which emphasizes the 
control of ideas rather than the promotion of creation and communication, is a key 
reason for the lack of effective IPR protection.42 Some other researchers attribute 
enforcement issues to Chinese people’s mindset, arguing that “respect for property 
must be a notion well-engraved not only in law but in the minds of political 
leaders and citizens alike.”43 This seems to be a widely held belief in the industry, 
and a number of U.S. companies consider “investment in IPR awareness, training, 
and education to be a major part of their companies’ ‘coping strategy’” for 
China’s IPR situation.44 Indeed, a few months after the Strategy Outline was 
promulgated in 2008, Microsoft launched an annual Global Anti-Piracy Day, “a 
simultaneous launch of education initiatives and enforcement actions” that 
“include intellectual property awareness campaigns, engagements with partner 
businesses, educational forums, local law enforcement training, and new legal 
actions against alleged software counterfeiters and pirates.”45 The press release 
                                                        
40 Yuezhi Zhao and Dan Schiller, “Dances with Wolves? China’s Integration into Digital 
Capitalism,” Info 3, no. 2 (2001), 137-151. 
41 Michael Keane, Created in China: The Great New Leap Forward (London: Routledge, 
2007), 81. 
42 Alford, To Steal a Book.  
43 Oksenberg, Potter, and Abnett, “Advancing Intellectual Property Rights,” 9. 
44 Ibid., 26-27. 
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from Microsoft China disclosed a number of training and enforcement activities 
conducted “in cooperation with the Global Anti-Piracy Day,” including Microsoft 
providing training sessions to law enforcement officers and “active assistance (jiji 
xiezhu)” to enforcement raids and investigations.46 In January 2012, Microsoft 
China launched a three-day activity to promote software copyright protection. In 
collaboration with a number of computer markets in large cities, Microsoft set up 
information booths, provided on-site consultations, hung anti-piracy banners in 
computer stores, and distributed pamphlets and other materials to consumers and 
sellers in the markets.47 
Meanwhile, China has been actively pursuing a pro-IPR national image on 
the international stage. Starting in 2013, every IPR Propaganda Week receives a 
pre-recorded video presentation by the World Intellectual Property Organization’s 
(WIPO) Director General Francis Gurry. In 2017, the Propaganda Week held a 
summit forum (gaoceng luntan) and enlisted a number of speakers from the 
WIPO, foreign governments, as well as major Western companies such as 
Qualcomm. As a matter of fact, the World Intellectual Property Day, on which 
China’s IPR Propaganda Week is based, was adopted by the WIPO at the 
suggestion of China and Algeria. In China’s 1999 proposal, the head of SIPO 
stated that the World Intellectual Property Day was to “further promote the 
awareness of intellectual property protection, expand the influence of intellectual 
property protection across the world, urge countries to publicize and popularize 
intellectual property protection laws and regulations, enhance the public legal 
awareness of intellectual property rights, encourage invention-innovation 
activities in various countries and strengthen international exchange in the 
                                                                                                                                                       
Efforts to Protect Customers and Partners Around the World From Software Piracy and 
Counterfeiting,” Microsoft.com, 2008, 
https://news.microsoft.com/2008/10/20/microsoft-announces-global-anti-piracy-day-to-hi
ghlight-collaborative-efforts-to-protect-customers-and-partners-around-the-world-from-s
oftware-piracy-and-counterfeiting/#LSMevAUu1rIk0Sqm.97.  
46 Microsoft, “Weiran Sheli Quanqu Daobanri [Microsoft Establishes Global Anti-piracy 
Day],” Microsoft.com, 2008, http://news.microsoft.com/zh-cn/微软设立全球反盗版宣传
日，保护全球各地的消费/#sm.0001nqy75or6hetoq2a1unkzsbf2o.  
47 “Weiruan Xinnian Zhengban Ruanjian Xuanchuang Hongdong Qidong [Microsoft Kicks 
Off New Year Publicity on Authentic Software],” CNET, 2012, 
http://www.cnetnews.com.cn/2012/0109/2073839.shtml.  
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intellectual property field.”48 In 2008, China made another effort to promote a 
pro-IPR national image right after the promulgation of the Strategy Outline and 
shortly before the Beijing Olympics. During his trip to the U.S. for the fourth 
round of Strategic Economic Dialogue between the two countries, then Vice 
Premier Wang Qishan published an article on the Wall Street Journal. Entitled 
“No More Chinese Knock-offs,” Wang introduced China’s national IPR strategy 
to the readers of the newspaper. He informed them that China will “launch 
extensive educational programs among the public to further encourage innovation, 
promote such moral standards as honesty and credibility, and to condemn 
plagiarism, piracy and counterfeiting,” as well as to “raise people's IPR awareness 
and foster an innovation-friendly IPR culture in which knowledge and integrity 
are respected and laws and regulations are complied with.”49            
China’s extensive engagement with Western ideas and corporations in IPR 
promotion takes place against the Chinese state’s complicated relations with both 
transnational capital and domestic market powers. First, China’s IPR development 
initialized as an elite-driven project which aims at “learning from the West,”50 
and “mainstream” Western ideological positions and industrial practices of IPR 
have had profound impact on policy and lawmaking in China. In spite of intense 
IPR frictions between China and major Western countries, China has seldom, if 
ever, launched serious challenges to the legitimacy of intellectual property. IPR 
problems have always been addressed on the basis of, rather than up against, 
Western frameworks of IPR. Wang’s article well illustrates this point by 
reassuring readers of the Wall Street Journal that China shares the same 
understanding of IPR.51 In another interesting case of China-West friction, the 
Chinese government put Qualcomm under an anti-trust investigation, which 
resulted in a staggering $975 million fine in 2015. However, given the size and 
potential of China’s market, this was indeed a “lenient approach” that “left the 
company’s [Qualcomm’s] business model intact” and provided “a stepping-stone 
                                                        
48 Ying Jiang, “Proposal By The State Intellectual Property Office, The People's Republic 
Of China,” 1999, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20031222105639/http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/docum
ent/govbody/wo_gb_ga/ga24_8.htm.  
49 Wang, “No More Chinese Knock-offs.” 
50 Han, “How the Copyright Law Was (Not) Made.” 
51 Wang, “No More Chinese Knock-offs.” 
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toward full participation in the Chinese market.”52 It manifests conflicts between 
China’s technonationalist agendas and transnational capital, but more importantly 
also highlights a consensus regarding the platform to resolve such conflicts: an 
IPR-based market and regulatory model. In the face of various resistances to the 
global IPR regime, it makes perfect sense for them to work together on the 
promotion of intellectual property.      
In contrast, domestic media and technology companies have yet to play a 
high-profile role in IPR propaganda, which needs to be attributed to their uneasy 
situation with regard to intellectual property. On the one hand, many state-owned 
corporations as well as private businesses have been under fire in Western 
criticisms of IPR offenses. For example, China Central Television (CCTV), 
China’s flagship TV network and the Communist Party’s mouthpiece, has been 
singled out by the European Union Trade Commissioner for not paying royalties 
to European copyright holders.53 The e-commerce giant Alibaba has always been 
criticized for not doing enough to curb the sale of counterfeit goods on its online 
shopping platform Taobao. 54  Considering that China’s IPR promotional 
campaigns aim at not only promoting awareness and compliance but also 
projecting a pro-IPR image of China for the Western audience, it is more 
important to craft a flawless, coherent narrative to showcase China’s 
achievements than to remind the audience of unresolved frictions. In the Summit 
Forum during the 2017 Propaganda Week, the only keynote speaker from the 
industry was from Qualcomm (in spite of the antitrust investigation of the 
company in 2015). Keynote speeches representing China’s voices (apart from 
governmental officials) were from scholars and writers, individuals with clean 
records of IPR offenses. Representatives of domestic businesses were present, but 
were seated with the audience.  
Nevertheless, China’s state-owned and private businesses are rapidly 
                                                        
52 Yu Hong, “Pivot to Internet Plus: Molding China’s Digital Economy for Economic 
Restructuring?” International Journal of Communication 11, (2017), 1495.  
53  “China: EU's Mandelson Says PRC Broadcasters Not Paying Royalties,” BBC 
Monitoring World Media - Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, November 8, 2006. 
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preparing themselves to benefit from IPR and to actively participate in IPR 
promotion. Having gone through multiple copyright challenges, CCTV has been 
forcefully reforming its production management to be copyright-compatible.55 
Given the enormous production and market resources it controls, a 
copyright-ready CCTV will have much to gain from IPR promotion and 
enforcement. Meanwhile, private Internet companies have made remarkable 
progress in IPR management56 and have actively engaged in the promotion of 
intellectual property in a number of ways. In an interesting case in 2014, an IPR 
executive in a private technology company co-authored a novel with a staff 
worker at the SIPO’s Propaganda Department. Based on the IPR executive’s 
career experience, the novel told a story about how a Chinese IT company grew 
from being patent-less to aggressively employing IPR tools to compete with 
market rivals. Titled “Ferocious Patents (zhuanli xiongmeng),” the novel quickly 
became a bestseller after publication, topping the bestseller list and surpassing 
books by well-known popular writers. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen how 
and when Chinese domestic companies may play front-seat roles in China’s 
endeavor to upgrade the “Made in China” brand to the “Created in China” 
imaginary and to put up a pro-IPR stance.57  
At the same time, IPR promotional projects often show an ambiguous attitude 
toward social resistance to intellectual property. Two cases highlight the point. In 
2006, a parody video that mocked a blockbuster movie went viral on the Chinese 
Internet. Widely known as Mantou, the popular video used clips from the movie 
Wuji and retold the story in a derisive tone. When the movie director threatened to 
sue for copyright infringement, the widely recognized controversy triggered an 
intellectual property debate. On the one hand, research by legal and media 
professionals quickly found that the video would be deemed fair use in Western 
countries, including the U.S., but it was almost certainly an infringement under 
                                                        
55 Dong Han, “Copyrighting Media Labor and Production: A Case of Chinese Television,” 
Television & New Media 13, no. 4 (2012), 283-306.   
56 “World Intellectual Property Day: BAT's Patent Approval Rates Near 70%, with 360 Far 
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the stringent Chinese law. On the other hand, Internet users sided overwhelmingly 
with the video since the copyright controversy had come to symbolize the conflict 
between the grassroots and the elite.58 At one of those rare opportunities in which 
IPR comes to the center of media and public attention spontaneously, the 
government had no intention to disseminate legal knowledge, educate the people, 
or draw from the masses (as the mass line principle would require). When asked 
about the case in a press conference, an official from the National Copyright 
Administration refused to comment and only said that the court would rule on it.59 
During the IPR Propaganda Week of 2006, no efforts were made to utilize the 
popular case of Mantou to popularize the law.  
In 2008, another copyright controversy swept through the Chinese Internet. A 
university teaching staff who produced a plug-in (shanhuchong, or coral worm) 
for a popular messaging application (QQ) was arrested under criminal charges. 
His arrest triggered a widespread revolt online for a number of reasons. First, 
plug-ins were popular on the Chinese Internet at the time. They did not change the 
original software codes but worked with them to provide different functions, thus 
had been thought to be free from copyright problems. Second, the company that 
owned QQ, Tencent, had previously worked with the defendant to use 
shanhuchong’s popularity to promote QQ. Third, the arrest and later trial of the 
defendant had many problems. Unverified stories online claimed that Tencent, a 
Chinese cyber giant, manipulated the case from behind the scene. Media coverage 
of the trial was minimal and controlled, and personal accounts published online 
implicated that the trial was unfair. In spite of online rallies in support of the 
defendant, as well as analyses from legal professionals that insisted on his 
innocence, the court handed down a guilty verdict with a three-year sentence.60 
Before the ruling, a local TV network produced and aired a documentary that 
framed the defendant as a criminal. Entitled “Coral Worm Into Flame (puhuo de 
shanhuchong),” it drew a parallel between the plug-in producer and a moth that 
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headed toward self-destruction. With very little coverage of the case by 
mainstream media, the TV documentary stood out as the major official account of 
the controversy. 
In these two cases, the Chinese state reacted differently from the case of 
Shanzhai cell phones. While official media coverage of bandit cell phones shows 
the state striving to “reposition itself in relation to Shanzhai so as to re-emerge a 
legitimate leader for ‘the people’,”61 the cases of Mantou and coral worm suggest 
that the state’s repositioning may be inconsistent, incoherent, and conditioned by 
case-specific contexts. First, by competing with international brands, Shanzhai 
cell phones coincided with the state’s technonationalist agenda, which lent 
themselves to the state’s effort to “re-direct their [the people’s] energy toward 
‘proper’ national ends.”62 In the cases of Mantou and coral worm, however, IPR 
holders were leading Chinese media and IT corporations (China Film Group 
Corporation and Tencent, respectively), both symbols of Chinese entrepreneurial 
prowess. As a matter of fact, China Film Group Corporation (CFGC) had sought 
to create a nationalist aura for Wuji, target of Mantou’s critical remarks, by 
marketing it as a movie to “represent China (daibiao zhongguo)” to compete in 
the Academy Awards.63 Therefore, it might be difficult for the state to steer the 
controversies toward a nationalist agenda in the same way as bandit cell phones.   
In addition, the cases of Mantou and coral worm demonstrate aspects of IPR 
promotions which are not readily visible in well-orchestrated annual campaigns. 
In the case of Mantou, state-owned media outlets including digital media 
platforms hosted heated debates and served as key venues for popular criticisms 
on intellectual property, cultural industrial policy, and China’s social polarization. 
It posed a sharp contrast to not only the ambiguous stance of copyright officials, 
but also the unified voice found in annual propaganda campaigns. The absence of 
Mantou in formal governmental statements and propaganda campaigns suggests 
that state propagandist maneuvers tend to marginalize and downplay bottom-up 
challenges, rather than to tackle them head-on. It also shows that the Leninist 
propagandist media control is neither total nor round-the-clock. Engaging in full 
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gear only in critical moments and on critical subjects, e.g. during the annual IPR 
Propaganda Week, it manifests the power of the state apparatus as well as its 
limitations. The case of coral worm, on the other hand, shows a complicit 
collaboration between propaganda media and domestic private capital, as well as 
fissures between local and national propagandist agendas. Though Tencent denied 
its involvement in the case, it was no doubt the major beneficiary of the 
prosecution of coral worm. Active involvement of local governmental media 
points to a high-level correlation between IPR propaganda and private market 
interests. Meanwhile, however, Shenzhen TV station’s aggressive stance is very 
different from national media and governmental organs, which often remain 
ambiguous and silent regarding bottom-up resistance to the IPR regime.           
  
Conclusion  
 
To popularize an officially sanctioned understanding of the legal system is critical 
for the Chinese Communist Party to legitimize its rule in post-socialist 
conditions.64 Meanwhile, IPR promotion in China also strives to serve specific 
economic policy and regulatory goals. Born out of pufa campaigns, IPR 
propaganda inherits the Communist Party’s long-term press philosophy that seeks 
to use media to shape worldviews and mobilize the masses for social and political 
causes. Thus, present-day promotional campaigns have important connections 
with the pre-reform era. On the other hand, however, messages crafted and 
disseminated in today’s propaganda campaigns are very different from 
anti-capitalist, anti-imperialism messages of old times. As part of the ideological 
shifts in the reform era, how easy or difficult they fit with a media system and 
philosophy that took shape in China’s revolutionary and socialist past can shed 
important light on the nature of Chinese media and social transformation both 
before and during the market reform. 
 China’s IPR propaganda campaigns show little conscious effort to reconcile 
Chinese media’s anti-capitalist past with the promotion of a property system that 
undergirds the contemporary capitalist political economy. While China’s 
revolutionary past has in essence been in pursuit of an alternative, non-capitalist 
developmental path,65 by internalizing the logic of the global IPR regime, China’s 
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IPR propaganda has rendered China’s development as a catch-up process on the 
same route as Western industrialized countries. Thus Vice Premier Qishan Wang’s 
Wall Street Journal article serves as a case in point by arguing that: “On IPR, 
China has managed to accomplish in 30 years what took Western-developed 
countries more than 100 years,” and that China “still has a long way to go before 
it can catch up with the U.S.”66 Absent from Wang’s statement is the possibility 
of an “alternative account of China’s rise” that may destabilize or challenge the 
power relations of the global capitalist political economy.67 Ironically, the image 
of being a “catcher-up” will in the long run work against China by placing China 
at “an elementary stage on a universal developmental track.” 68  Under the 
dominant discourse of the global IPR regime, it is “economic and political 
prowess” that defines and produces creativity.69 As a follower, China will always 
be subject to the discursive power of the image of a copycat. China’s IPR cultural 
project, if always on the heels of the West and distancing itself from grassroots 
dynamics of resistance and meaning-making, will only run against the 
developmental goal that policymakers envision.                        
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